Re(1):
'The Third Airplane', Belmont Club, TC Wretchard
Re(2):
'UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events',
www.un.org, UNSCOM report
A response to a poster named AK at the BelmontClub:
AK,
Your first post stated: “Why was his nuclear program apparently shelved in 1994?”
Here is the United Nations official documentation regarding
UNSCOM…
After your date of compliance:
8 Aug 1995: Iraq withdraws its third biological Full, Final and Complete Disclosure and admits a far more extensive biological warfare programme than previously admitted, including weaponization. Iraq also admits having achieved greater progress in its efforts to indigenously produce long-range missiles than had previously been declared. Iraq provides UNSCOM and the IAEA with large amounts of documentation, hidden on a chicken farm ostensibly by Hussein Kamel, related to its prohibited weapons programmes which subsequently leads to further disclosures by Iraq concerning the production of the nerve agent VX and Iraq's development of a nuclear weapon.
Sep 1997: Iraq provides fifth Full, Final and Complete Disclosure for its prohibited biological weapons programme. An international panel of experts is convened in New York to discuss Iraq’s declaration. The panel unanimously finds Iraq’s declaration to be incomplete, inadequate and technically flawed.
Oct 1997: UNSCOM completes the destruction of additional, large quantities of chemical weapons related equipment and precursors chemicals. Iraq had previously denied that part of the equipment had been used for CW production. Only in May 1997, on the basis of UNSCOM's investigations, did Iraq admit that some of the equipment had indeed been used in the production of VX.
8 Apr 1998: The report of the biological weapons TEM is transmitted to the Council (S/1998/308). As with the other TEMs, the experts unanimously conclude that Iraq’s declaration on its biological weapons programme is incomplete and inadequate.
9 Sep 1998: Security Council resolution 1194 (1998) unanimously condemns Iraq’s decision to suspend cooperation with UNSCOM, terming Iraq’s actions a totally unacceptable contravention of Iraq’s obligations; demands Iraq rescind its decision and decides not to conduct the 60-day sanctions reviews until Iraq does so and the Commission reports to the Council that it is satisfied that it has been able to exercise its full range of activities, including inspections.
31 Oct 1998: Iraq announces that it will cease all forms of interaction with UNSCOM and its Chairman and to halt all UNSCOM’s activities inside Iraq, including monitoring. The Security Council, in a statement to the press, unanimously condemn Iraq’s decision to cease all cooperation with UNSCOM.
4 Nov 1998: The Executive Chairman informs the Council (S/1998/1032) that, as a result of Iraq’s actions, the Commission is not in a position to provide the Council with any level of assurance of Iraq’s compliance with its obligations not to retain and not to reestablish proscribed activities.
16 Dec 1998: The Special Commission withdraws its staff from Iraq.
When you talk about ‘Containing Iraq’ and ‘Keeping Saddam in a Box’ (not your quotes – but your concept) I would recommend that you review the official United Nations webpage chronology regarding the topic on which you place so much confidence. Try using the find feature to look for such phases as: ‘denies access’, ‘Final and Complete Disclosure’, and ‘nuclear’. In it’s 7 ½ years of existence we had five ‘Final and Complete Disclosures’ of biological weapons, three ‘Final and Complete Disclosures’ of chemical weapons, and three ‘Final and Complete Disclosures’ of illegal missile development. All those ‘Final and Complete Disclosures’ were deemed false. We found a rather robust – if temporarily hidden and dormant – nuclear program. And finally, with the Oil-For-Food revelations noted in Wretchard’s post we have both a bypass of the Saddam in a Box strategy and an aggressive bribing of security council members to drop those sanctions on which your concept rests. Look back in the large newspapers even as late as early 2003 to review the positions of France, Russia, and Germany regarding the sanctions that both apparently (not really) kept Saddam contained and starved the children of Iraq.
I, personally, was not confident in those measures then, and I would be very distrustful of a Saddam popped out of the box now…